

**Раздел III
ФИЛОСОФИЯ ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ В ЗАПАДНОЙ
ТРАДИЦИИ**

**Part III. PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN THE WESTERN
TRADITION**

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**ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ КАК ДВИЖЕНИЕ ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКОГО
БЫТИЯ**

Н. Пелцова (Прага, Чешская республика)

В данной статье обсуждается проблема образования в контексте работ Яна Паточки. Образование рассматривается в форме трёх движений человеческого бытия: получение, воспроизводство и трансцендентирование. В статье раскрывается содержание теории образования Паточки как некоторого движения человеческого бытия и современной европейской традиции, обсуждается значение этой теории для современных теорий образования. Образование понимается как некий шанс встречи с поколением на определенной общей основе и как диалог, конфликт и борьба между поколениями. Оно также понимается как непрерывность культуры и разрывность необходимых метаморфоз, как симметричные и асимметричные взаимоотношения, основанные на ответственности.

Ключевые слова: образование, движение, метаморфоза, встреча, состязание.

EDUCATION AS A MOVEMENT OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

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This article deals with the issue of education in the context of the work of Jan Patočka. Education is considered in the form of three movements of human existence: receiving, reproduction and transcendence. It reveals the relationship between Patočka's theory of education as a movement of human existence and modern European traditions and discusses the meanings of this theory for today's theories on education. Education is understood as a chance to meet a generation on common ground and as a dialogue, conflict and struggle across the

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generations. It is also understood as a continuity of culture and discontinuity of necessary metamorphoses, as a symmetric and asymmetric relationship based on responsibility.

Key words: *education, movement, metamorphosis, encounter, agon.*

Jan Patočka is one of the few world or at least European renowned Czech philosophers (apart from Comenius and Masaryk) and his deep professional knowledge and civic virtues are most worthy of our attention. Patočka was born on the 1st of June 1907 in Turnov and died on the 13th of March 1977. He was an exponent of phenomenology; he domesticated, translated and commented on the works of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Eugen Fink, and Max Scheler etc. In 1936, he habilitated with his paper entitled *The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem*. He worked in the philosophical faculty of Charles University between 1945 and 1949. During this time he lectured antic philosophy Lectures from the classic Greek philosophy of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. His books were still being published up to 1989. From 1950 he worked at the John Amos Comenius Pedagogical Research Institute. He won European recognition during his Comenius phase and his name is connected with the study of Comenius' philosophy of education (theory of education as amendments). He set Comenius in the wider context of European thinking (by examining his relationship with Mikuláš Kusánský, René Descart and Francis Bacon). In the 1960s he was able to return to Charles University and the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, but not long after, in 1972, he was superannuated during the normalization process. He later went on to write his most famous works: *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History* etc. In 1977 he was one of the founders and first spokesman of *Charta 77*.

Patočka has a special type of philosophy, not abstract theory but a kind of attitude towards human life which fulfills his basic theory that philosophy has no sense in itself as a form of pure science but it is in essence education. Therefore, he returned to the Socrates/Plato tradition of dialogue as a basic form of philosophy and philosophizing, which helps man understand the meaning of his own life, his role in society and position in the world. Understanding does not leave us indifferent but changes our lives.

His work is not entirely characterized in the study; I focus mainly on the problem of philosophical education, which Patočka addressed since his very earliest philosophical years. I introduce three phases of his theory of education and relate them to a certain form of movement of human existence. The first is represented by the texts of his lectures entitled 'The philosophy of education' (from 1938-39), the second is Patočka's Comenius phase during the 1950s and 1960s. The third and final is the theory of education in later texts and in particular 'The natural world and its author's reflections after thirty-three years.' (1969)

The links between education, life and movement in J. Patočka's work show that it is not only a pedagogical reflex. A professional pedagogical attitude would typically consider education as a long-term, targeted process, methodically forming the human character and its holistic, social, intellectual, cognitive, emotional, and moral development. I have highlight deliberateness, orderliness, and long-standing behavior from the point of view of the possibilities of obtaining

set goals, from an assumption of the *continuity* of the development of community and continuity of the development of man himself. Man becomes human through education; the social approach of education is a condition for man's further existence.

The philosophical reflex of education is not less specific than the pedagogical reflex; however, it is typical to break down the real manifestation of a practical process of education and education into basic (ontological and anthropological) layers, where one can grasp onto the fundamental features and assumptions of the possibilities of education in a holistic context of the world, community and man's relation with himself as an integral entity. This can be reached through thematizing, problematizing that which is seemingly obvious, and analyzing our experiences with education and education (i.e. we have all been educated and brought up and sooner or later we have to raise others). As Patocka says in the Philosophy of education, this is best achieved by asking skeptic, doubting questions, "*which lead us slowly to a specific orientation point which reveals the path we should follow. Such doubting, skeptic questions come directly to us in life, we not only consider them through accepted thought pathways based on what we have learned but also we begin to think about things.*" (1, 7) Thus, it is not a definition of education, the basic concepts, methods and strategies (i.e. a professional scientific approach), or a continuity of life from young to old, but wonder, *discontinuity* of returning to the start of a journey which lets us find the orientation point, to see the path, to forsake accepted thoughts. Philosophy and education are a tremor of day-to-day actions and problematizing of everyday experiences, "*it is a movement, a clear process inside man which relates to a reflection of a nanvely natural and limited everydayness*". (1, 5)

By movement (education, thought), however, the author does not mean the external development and metamorphosis of an objective character based on the speed of transferred and conveyed knowledge, its frequency, reliability, cutting of corners and saving of time during the transfer of information. Although we have all fulfilled these parameters there has been no deepening of human relationships, on the contrary they have flattened and formalized. E-mail, internet, mobiles and other technical communication devices have sped up the transfer of information, but they often contribute to the emptying of the content of the communication.

Patocka speaks of a different movement. He often refers to philosophical movement as being a very complicated problem and he returns to the sources of deliberation on the nature of movement, i.e. to Aristotle. Aristotle distinguished between several movements: *motus* external movement, outwardly describable and producible by coordinates as movement in space, from place to place, from start to finish, *kinesis* movement of the organism caused by external influences, movement as an answer to these influences, and *metabole* internal metamorphosis and growth of an organism (increase and decrease in size). These movements do not concern us here however, the most important movements for us are *genesis*, *fhora*, *dynamis* and *entelecheia* as forms of existence and the movements of *dynamis tu paschein* potentiality and acting upon, *dynamis tu poiein* potentiality and being acted upon and *telos* movements to our own form, to our naturalness.

For Patocka education is a type of dynamis, the possibility for one's own development and transformation. Education is sufferance (it leads man to reject instant experiences in favor of long term ones) and implicates metamorphosis (for example, the opening up of new possibilities); education has sense and directs one to certain goals (telos), in education it restores all of the hidden bias of the educated and educators. *"In such an activity, internal movement, something new opens up within man, in such an activity he changes internally."* (1, 9) Therefore, we should not think of education and education only as a process of developing understanding, knowledge, skills, competence and values. Education should touch man in their autonomous center and in their inclusiveness (i.e. life in society and being in the world).

In the 1930s, Patocka criticized the well-known irrational objection which even today is often heard from students and their parents: Why do I (my children) have to learn something that I (they) will never need in life? The aspect of practice comes from the assumption of set goals for which man selects certain resources, as if it was a closed circle, nothing more is needed ... it is a objection that is as old (modern) as school itself. However, school is not and never was merely a place to attain qualifications, knowledge or work competence.

As Patocka says *"...a school pupil should not only learn through resources to reach a certain goal, but he should learn to want something more."*(1, 9) This basic experience of "wanting something more" is based on the understanding of human possibilities (Aristotle's dynamis, energeia) in the context of the world as a whole. A philosopher close to Patocka, Eugen Fink, for example calls it the "oceans sensation", it is a relationship with immensurability, with the infinite, with perfection. (5, 37)

"When this happens, man feels something new, he feels a special movement, everything gains new meaning, the world suddenly opens up into new and wide horizons. It breaks through the everydayness, it blunts normality; it is a starting point for the education process which Europeans have given meaning to throughout history."(1, 10)

Qualifications are gained to prepare man to solve specific life situations, education however "opens the world in a wider context", to rise up out of particularity into entirety.

Education should therefore be considered in the context of the world as a whole, in its original dimension. This original dimension is found in the soil of the natural world, in the original experience with one's self. Education is characterized by forming the life of human existence in relation to oneself and others. *"If we think of education as being formalization, molding of the possibilities given to man by nature, education is given by three moments: in society there are adults, i.e. already molded, and non adults, yet to be molded, together, thus a change in the generations; the new generation is not incomplete; and finally the members of these various generations belong together, this belonging together provides them with certain tasks. They must look after each other."* (1, 22). Education is not a unilateral process of formalization, seniors influencing juniors, the experienced influencing the inexperienced, the educated the uneducated and adults minors, it is not causal linear determination, but a *mutual* relationship;

it is an expression of belonging together and the solidarity of a generation. It is a relationship that crosses the generations and builds communities, their culture and existence. It is based on the fact that education is an introduction to a world which is older than all of us and which allows that which another Czech philosopher, Jaroslava Pesková calls the basic task of education, namely to “join in common things”.

Education is a relationship between the educator and the educated, intended not randomly (firstly in the pedocentrism of children, and secondly in the authoritarian concepts of the educator) but through a common subject, interest, caring for self and one’s own existence. This is Heidegger’s *Sorge*: Man is a being which takes care of his own existence. In an educational relationship we feed our own existence, not the existence of others, i.e. the educator. Education is a mutual journey in which we can become one in ourselves. (The largest educational misdemeanor is for children to fulfill the ambitions of their parents.) Education cannot avoid conflicts (with the educator, educated, with oneself), therefore Patocka characterizes education as a *match*, which is played in an educational situation. *“The result of this match should never be the victory of one or another but a certain compromise, which can be considered ultimately as a victory for those who are educated, not merely for those who educate... the task of the educator is complete (of course in an individual sense) if the student, based on their ability, manages to develop their own original lives along the pathways developed by the teacher...”* (1, 42)

The scintillation between the participants, about themselves and others, is expressed in the poem by Antonin Sova entitled *Učitel zákovi* (Teacher to pupil): *“My pupil, my rival comes to me on my path, I want to compel him so he prevails.”* This motto binds the teacher to support the pupil in his independence, in his own possibilities and at best when the pupil is not a mere follower but is better and unlike the teacher, a partner and a true continuator. *“You must learn to win my dear pupil, against me, it is honorable.”* The teacher is thus there to be surpassed (1, 43). Education is an awakening of activity, strength (Patocka cites Bergson’s *élan vital* in the educator and the educated). The educator cares for himself – his own existence, the student and the existence of society; within the educated there is an awakening of his own possibilities (rising up from subservience, incompleteness), freedom (to be alone in society with others) and responsibility (for a shared world).

In the second concept of Comenius research I will refer mainly to Patocka’s work **Comenius and the open soul**. Here the author differentiates between two standpoints of education at the gates of a modern age: the first is the “closed soul” and against this stands Comenius’ “open soul”. The standpoint of the “closed soul” comes from subjectivity conceived by way of “thinking me”; independent understanding assumes the right to structure the world according to one’s own plan (a subjective-objective plan of the world, the world conceived as a machine – *machina mundi*), because of this the “closed soul” can only “encounter itself”, beyond this it recognizes nothing else, it must solve each problem with its own strength and resources. Its fundamental task is seen from the perspectives of control, assist and integrate. The concept of a closed soul gives rise to the tradition of instrumental education as a tool for mastering the world, society and oneself.

For Comenius understanding is only one of many strengths (in addition to morality, free will, piety and faith). Man is bound to the world (we are all on the same world stage), we cannot rise above it and become an impartial onlooker, an objective observer (like in the concept of the closed soul).

Patocka states that in **The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart** the wanderings of the pilgrim can be demonstrated (self-fixation of an open soul...in the paradise of the heart) using two alternatives: on the one side is the labyrinth of pure worldliness and on the other side the truth of spiritual existence, Comenius advises us to find the path of inwardness and faith. Patocka compares Plato's prisoners of the cave with Comenius' pilgrim; both are deprived of their freedoms and opinions. The shackles of Plato's prisoners correspond to the bridle held by Knowall-Ubiquitous and the glasses that Delusion places on the pilgrim. The tasks of the companions however are different, whereas Plato's prisoners turn to the light and true knowledge, Comenius's pilgrim, "is not misled by the veil of light but eliminates life's pressures. He compels himself to take the unavoidable basic decisions of life lightly. He shows his difficulties and obligations in a rosy light; enticed by newly changing and radiant things so hindering examination in its own sense. ... the pilgrim is not a passively sitting prisoner like Plato's, but within his seemingly positive mobility lies the cause of his delusion and blunder. Mobility is mistaken and worthless." (2, 342)

On one side we have the fixed gaze of Plato's prisoners, on the other the superficial fickleness of Comenius' pilgrim. An obstruction to true understanding can be the *lack* of understanding, the distorted and limited insight (Plato's prisoners have only what they see in the shadow theater) of his knowledge has the character of *doxa*, common belief; so Comenius' flood of irrelevant information and false images leads us away from the truth, from substance and leaves us to wander and gaze at superficiality.

According to Patocka, that which the guide conceals is death, acting as if it was not mortal life. Unmasking death as an abyss of nothingness thus ends the control of the pilgrim's companions. "Revelation of nothingness is, ..., the basic act of an open soul." (2, 343) After this *reversal in the understanding of meaning* he stops being a self-extradited pilgrim, the salutary voice of God resonates and leads him from the nothingness of the world to a positive existence.

In The center of safety (Centrum securitatis) the basic experience of the open soul is narrated in a slightly different way to the Labyrinth. The embroilment of man in the world is identified by man's wandering path to happiness, man's devoutness, his motives and self, the desire to be the center of one's self and all others. Patocka evaluates this next step in the development of thought very critically and regards Comenius' attempt to identify with a modern picture of the world and modern understanding with the concept of a closed soul as being a dangerous simplification. The danger lies in the opinion that it is both possible and necessary for there to be other natural sciences than modern mathematics. Comenius places *syncrisis* (knowledge from analogy based on a metaphysical interpretation of world events as a whole) against the contemporary scientific methods of induction and deduction. With this Comenius puts himself in a position beyond the main flow of scientific

knowledge. *“He is discontent with knowledge and appreciation, modern science does not offer anything whole and in this sense it is necessary and correct”* (1, 345) criticizes Patocka.

The last concept of education as a movement of human existence is contained in Patocka’s latter work, **The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem after 33 years** and in **Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History**.

The natural world (Husserl’s *Lebenswelt*) is not an objective givenness; it is, as Patocka puts it, a correlation of meaning, a correlation of life in the world, in the sense of intelligible coherence. It is a horizon, a background in which phenomena may arise; it is a context in which we understand things. It is the natural world in which human existence is formed in its temporal (anticipation, presence and retention) and spatial definition (closeness and remoteness). Existence itself is a movement where three basic human possibilities take place, it is not a cellular movement, but holistic, the movement of existence. The first of Patocka’s movements is anchorage, rooting or acceptance. The second is self-assertion, in other words work and struggle and the third is the movement towards truth or in truth, in other words the movement of transcendence. Holistic movements are a relationship or movement towards so-called arbitrators, a fixed foot-hold, which movement permits, collates and directs. The arbitrator of the first movement of anchorage is home, the arbitrator of the second movement self-assertion is the world and the arbitrator of the third movement of transcendence is truth itself.

Patocka in his deliberations of home (3, 86) emphasizes the difference between the center and movement, as a difference between the home and strangeness, between the normality of the home and the exoticism of that which is far away. Home permeates through recognition, familiarity and everydayness which is not banal but opposite to strange, exotic.

The difference is articulated not only by space but also by time. The regular movement of life belongs to home: relaxation and work, refreshment and sleep, recreation and employment, food and love. Closeness is not only spatial but also temporal; it is something like the fourth temporal dimension. The first three are the past, present and future.

They split here with the coming together of young and old, childhood and adulthood. Home is a place to encounter generations. Home is also an encounter of men and women, man fetches and woman preserves. It is an expanding future and cherished past, only this complementarity is augmented in the present, it gathers together and forms this fourth dimension – closeness, credence, unity otherwise divided. Only this complementarity creates a home. The home is a place in the world where we are accepted – we can recall Patocka’s movement of acceptance as primarily human.

The home is the center of the natural world; it is a place where we are at most with ourselves. Patocka uses Comenius’ phrase of home as a gulf of safety, “it is the part of the universe that most penetrates man, things here are so to say organs of our life, they are *τα πράγματα*, with them we almost always know what to think.” (3, 86) The home is an extended organism, it is our elongated body. To quote Gaston Bachelard, “Our family home is physically

inscribed on us. It is a type of organic custom. After twenty years, against all anonymous staircases, we would find reflexes of the “first staircase”; we would not trip on the top step. The whole existence of home would unfold faithfully to our existence.” (4, 53) The experience of home guides us throughout our whole life, in which we move as it were unwittingly, with closed eyes.

For this to take place, a house must be a home, domesticated, snug, furnished – therefore we find that we cannot throw away old toys so we do not throw away part of our childhood, or old postcards so we do not end our relationship with people who maybe are no longer with us. Near is never trivial. Closeness is not given, one must strive for closeness, it is a task shared by men and women, parents and children, old and young.

Home is not only a place where we are physically present, even if a house often stops being a home the moment someone close to us leaves. To have somewhere to return to is linked to the important feeling that someone is waiting for you there.

Diversification of a home – like human relationships anchored to things, like a residence, like a neighborhood, like a human phenomenon, a means of topo-analyzing man, space for comfort and intimacy highlights the fact that home, the same as displacement, is a basic form of existence.

The home is a place which opens up wider spaces; it is a place to encounter generations, occupations, friends, acquaintances, neighbors. Home is a horizon in this sense, by which man opens the world, it is an angle of sight from which we understand the world and how we behave towards it. To quote Bachelard we can say, “Before man was plunged into the world, as metaphysics recognize, he was placed in the cradle of the home.” (4, 53) Home is a place of intimacy and refuge where the world opens up for us. Man is a distant being and therefore he needs a home. Without a home man is a scattered being, in this sense home is a *stabilitas loci*.

Acceptance to the world and the home takes place in the first movement of human existence – anchoring. However, the world does not accept us in its immeasurable form but in its human advocates – parents, fosterers. “*The world arched over human community, in human understanding, something as an internal core,...this is the content of the core protected against the exterior.*” (3, 232) With this acceptance we can develop our own possibilities. Acceptance means the protection of our existence based on the care and concern of others. However, acceptance not only means sufferance (*dynamis tu paschein*), but also active causation (*dynamis tu poiein*). We accept acceptance through tears, smiles, outstretched arms, in blessed delight we transform into representatives of the world. “*The face of a closed existence, its expression becomes the face of the world...*” (3, 234) To quote Dilthey, “A mother is a child full of reality. For someone who has had a happy and affectionate childhood, life can no longer harm them much...”

The second movement is projection, or self-assertion, or the movements of work and struggle. Here man aspires to his own form, he stands before the task of providing life’s resources, to form a career, to assert oneself among others (reduction of existence into a social role), to objectify and run the risk of perpetuation. Work and struggle represent opposing principles. Work turns man to things and struggle turns man to people (man captivated and captor).

In this movement we aspire to self-determination, appreciation, in it we eliminate the danger of self-deprivation and estrangement.

The third movement is the movement of breakthrough, or truth in truth, in other words the movement of transcendence. This movement it is not about an encounter with a strange existence but with one's own. *"In the last movement, the movement of existence itself, we can see the most innate human essence and potential – subcelestialness, which is also a relationship with existence and the universe."* (3, 245)

The third movement reveals the fundamental dimension of the natural world, that which is not given evades recollection, it evades material identification, which this world substantially underlies. It gives it meaning.

Patočka shows this third movement in his paper on civil involvement.

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ТЕЛО И РЕЧЬ

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Язык тела реализует наиболее естественный и удобопонятный диалог в мире. Рассматривается значение Олимпийских игр на фоне языка тела, роль рук в жизненных движениях, роль речи с точки зрения человеческих принципов.

Ключевые слова: *речь, говорить, язык тела, феноменология, интенциональность.*

THE BODY AND SPEECH

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Body language is the most natural and most understandable dialogue in the world. The significance of the Olympic Games against the backdrop of body language is considered, as well as the role of hands in life's movement, the role of speech from the point of view of human principles.

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