Home – Home – Jornals – Philosophy of Sciences 2024 number 5S

The article is devoted to the explication of the traditional Kantian concept a priori in the context of combining the philosophy of science and the history of philosophy. The so-called "relativized a priori " is considered as a methodological principle of modern science. A review of recent research in this area by M. Friedman and his opponents gives an idea of the dynamics of the inclusion of philosophical categories in the process of paradigm shift.

Carried out, which allows us to gradually demonstrate the historical change in approaches to understanding space and identify the main controversial points that were discussed. It is shown that the evolution of the concept of space is influenced by the development of mechanics, in particular such concepts as mass, inertia, force and motion. For Kant, the main motive was the desire to logically reconcile the ideas that arose in the natural sciences of that time and metaphysics.

In contemporary science, Kant’s well-known statement that the degree of scientificity of a discipline grow up together with the increase in the volume of mathematics used in it has the status of a practically normative criteria of scientific rigour. The main aim of the article consists in verification of validity of the criterion. I research Kant’s criterion from pragmatic positions. From a pragmatic point of view the basic element of the Kant’s criterion is universality of mathematics in the context of solving the different problems in any knowledge fields. One of the possible consequences of universality is the following conditional statement: if physics follows a mathematical style, then this leads to progress in knowledge. However, from of the history of physics it is known that von Neumann’s axiomatics of quantum physics wasn’t accepted by physicists. Using this and other examples I refute hypothesis about mathematical universality. In conclusion I propose some modification of Kant’s criterion.

The article gives the basic definitions of artificial intelligence, cites the main provisions of Kant's theory of cognition, which was ahead of its time, and notes their correspondence to the theoretical justification for the creation of artificial intelligence as a solution to the first part of the triune task of creating anthropomorphic artificial intelligence. Based on the study of scientific works of researchers directly involved in the creation of artificial intelligence systems, it was found that not only Kant's theory of cognition, but also his transcendental logic and a priori psychology are the theoretical basis for the creation of ultramodern artificial intelligence systems. The combination of Kant's cognitive science, Kant's transcendental logic and Kant's a priori psychology is called Kant's principles by modern researchers working in the field of artificial intelligence creation. In their opinion, it is practically impossible to create a strong anthropomorphic artificial intelligence without observing these principles. The creation of artificial intelligence is hindered by serious difficulties in the field of natural sciences, in particular neurophysiology, which is very far from explaining the principles of the human brain. In this regard, the understanding of the mechanism of operation of the created artificial intelligence systems also leaves much to be desired - sometimes the developers themselves are unable to determine how the final conclusions were obtained in the course of programmed processing of initial data. In connection with these problems, the author drew a parallel between the growing up of a child and the increasing amount of knowledge of mankind, which, perhaps, does not yet correspond to the solution of the task of creating a strong artificial intelligence.

What conditions does a robot have to satisfy to qualify as a moral agent? Should robots become moral agents, or should humanity fully retain agency and personhood for itself? Is it permissible to prevent robots from developing moral agency? This paper examines these questions from a viewpoint-neutral and a Kantian perspective. Regarding the first question, we argue that the Kantian standards for moral agency could not possibly be met by robots. The second and third questions are more difficult to answer, in part because the viewpoint-neutral perspective does not provide a clear verdict. We argue that it is a feature of the Kantian perspective to propose a plausible answer. The idea is that preventing robots from achieving moral personality is morally permissible, insofar as our intention is consistent with the respect of human life and its rational nature.

This article is a commentary on Lisa Benossi and Sven Bernecker's paper “A Kantian Perspective on Robot Ethics”. The development of artificial intelligent systems has led to an expansion or even blurring of the concept of agency, with the emphasis shifting from the autonomy of intention and action to the social effect of human-machine interaction. Benossi and Bernecker's article, which examines the Kantian view of moral agency, brings us back closer to the classical understanding of agency, allowing us to prioritize not the illusion of autonomy, but freedom of choice and moral responsibility.

Recently, the dominant philosophical paradigm in Western social and political sciences (SPS) has been criticized by a number of researchers and the necessity of transition to a new - quantum - transdisciplinary paradigm using ideas, concepts and formalism of quantum mechanics has been justified. We argue that the need for such a transition is due to the fact that the dominant paradigm is based on outdated assumptions and premises of Modern philosophy, which really should be abandoned. We also agree that it is quantum mechanics that contains the potential for a new philosophy. At the same time, we argue that what many authors take as the “quantum paradigm” in SPS is in fact in many ways not so much an overcoming of the Modern paradigm as a postmodernist radicalization of it. In other words, the alternative they propose turns out to be a pseudo-quantum alternative. We propose the conceptual scheme of a contextual quantum realism as a genuine quantum alternative.

In this article, the author examines the phenomenon of scientific piracy, i.e. copying and distributing scientific works through online libraries without the consent of the copyright holders. Despite the fact that such actions are prohibited by law in various countries, including the Russian Federation, this phenomenon has many supporters. In search of a philosophical basis for the legislative ban, the author refers to the work of Immanuel Kant "Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books" of 1798. It seems that the arguments against literary piracy presented by I. Kant have not lost their relevance and can be used to substantiate the position on the inadmissibility of copyright infringement at the present time in the era of total digitalization. Based on the philosophical basis proposed by I. Kant, as well as court practice (the conclusions of the US District Court formulated in the decision on the Elsevier v. Sci-Hub case), the author comes to the conclusion that the arguments of the supporters of scientific piracy are untenable.

The work presents the problem space of methodological work devoted to historical and philosophical research. The author, on the one hand, gives a short overview of the various foundations that are laid out by certain authors involved in the history of philosophy, on the other hand, he makes an attempt to show in general the entire architectonics of methodological approaches to the history of philosophy. The first part of the article is devoted to the so-called historical topic. The author shows that in general, if we are talking about the history of philosophy, then the topic of the historical requires a separate analysis. The author identifies in the historical topic positions, tops, according to which certain aspects of the historical are singled out - these are such as an event, a witness-participant of an event, a storyteller, a historian, a historiographer, a philosopher (methodologist) of history, the idea of history. Depending on through which top the topic of history is viewed, depending on this, the history of philosophy will look different and be viewed from different positions. The second part of the work is devoted to highlighting two directions of historical and philosophical research - contextualist and appropriationist (appropriating) approaches. Based on a review of existing works, the article discusses the extremes and transformed forms of these approaches, which consist in the fact that either the historian of philosophy goes into the antiquarian-museum genre of the history of philosophy, turning this or a philosophical work into a dead artifact (text), or appropriates the work of a philosopher for the sake of current problems on the modern agenda. The work makes an attempt to overcome the extremes of transformed forms of historical and philosophical research by bringing the position of the historian of philosophy into a metaplan, according to which it is necessary to understand not so much the context of a particular work, not so much the response to the modern agenda, but rather the source that was the basis for the precedent of philosophizing. No historical context in itself and no modern agenda can answer the question - what served as the secret of the creation of this or that philosophical work. But it is precisely the understanding of the source of a philosophical work that makes it possible to understand the act itself, the precedent of philosophizing as it is, without resorting in transformed forms.