

332.142+351.72

: , 2018, 2 (98), . 33–51

1

1996–1998

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, 2018, 2 (98)

2012 .

2014 .

1990-

[2; 7].

[3; 8; 9].

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2009 2015 .,

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: «... 10 , 2006 2015 .,
25 14: , 2001 .
(19)»³ –

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», 20 [6]. . .
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³ 10 //
2017. – 15 . – URL: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2017/04/05/684215-regionov-donorov> .

» [6, . XIV].

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1996–1998 .,

, 30, 50%, (. 1).

1996 . 1998 . ,

1996–1998

:[6].

(. 2 3).

2

1998 „, %

		-	
	2,9	4,0	4,6
	33,7	5,5	5,0
	56,7	20,3	20,5
	50,8	10,4	13,9
	2,2	5,7	4,2
	2,3	5,4	3,7
	4,2	11,5	11,0
	6,4	11,6	6,1
	4,9	13,9	14,2
	7,4	10,3	16,8
	4,0	6,2	7,0
	5,0	5,0	6,5

: [6].

1998 .., %

1998 .., %			
(-):
	4,5	7,4	3,7
	15,1	26,2	18,1
	15,0	24,5	21,2
	12,3	22,4	23,9
	55,1	19,4	33,1
	:		
	67,3	49,8	60,5
	48,7	5,9	10,9
	9,6	17,6	14,6
	23,1	32,6	24,9

: [6].

	, %					
	2013	2014	2016	2020	2025	2030
() -	36,9	35,1	34,4	34,6	33,6	32,7
() -	37,6	35,8	34,9	34,7	33,6	33,0
/	-0,7	-0,7	-0,5	0,1	0,0	-0,3
	19,3	18,2	17,4	16,6	15,4	14,2
	19,8	18,7	18,0	17,0	15,7	14,5
/	-0,5	-0,5	-0,6	-0,4	-0,3	-0,3
	12,7	12,6	12,4	12,5	12,6	12,9
	13,0	12,8	12,5	12,5	12,5	13,0
/	-0,3	-0,1	-0,02	0,0	0,1	-0,1

2018 2019 2020 / . – .. 2017.–
URL: http://komitet-bn.km.duma.gov.ru/upload/site7/ONBNiTTP_v_GD_03.07.17.pdf.

2013 .(.4), 2030 , -
(36,9 32,7%). 9% 2013 . 4,7%

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2030 . , ,

1,52 1,1. ,

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[4].

2013–2014 .,

2015–2016 .

2016 . - -

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2011–2016 . (. 5)

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2011–2016 .,

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	20,86	23,44	24,44	26,77	26,92	28,18
	15,21	16,98	17,91	19,33	21,06	23,34
	6,00	6,44	6,65	7,23	7,69	8,35
	1,64	1,62	1,52	1,67	1,62	1,58
	9,21	10,54	11,26	12,10	13,37	14,99
, %	39,4	37,9	37,1	37,4	36,5	35,8
, %	10,8	9,5	8,5	8,6	7,7	6,8

: 2018 , 2019 2020 / . – „ 2017.– URL: http://komitet-bn.km.duma.gov.ru/upload/site7/ONBNiTTP_v_GD_03.07.17.pdf .

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17, e-mail: klistorin@ieie.nsc.ru);

(630090, , : , 1).

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INTERLEVEL FINANCIAL FLOWS IN THE BUDGETARY SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The article examines direct and reverse financial flows between the regions and the government. It considers objectives of regional and budgetary policies and discusses methodical problems of estimating the size of financial flows and their interchangeability. We share a view that donor regions and recipient regions should be defined by balance surplus or deficit on all interlevel financial flows, not only based on gratuitous receipts or transfers from the federal budget. This approach makes it possible to eliminate partly the changes in budget legislation as related to allocating financial assistance to the regions. A comparison of the 1996–1998 and present studies shows that the number of donor regions has slightly increased over the period of review. We prove that the consolidation of public finances in Russia has not resulted in a significant decrease in differentiating the levels of regional development. The article reveals a trend: inter-budgetary transfers are partially replaced by direct expenses paid from the federal budget.

Keywords: consolidated budget; financial flows; transfers; direct expenses; donor regions; recipient regions; centralization of financial resources

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