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The paper solves the problem of deriving the relationship between the variability of statistical characteristics of atmospheric parameters measured by GNSS receivers and the characteristics of convective processes according to the monitoring data near the Kazan city for 2013-2021. The results of GNSS monitoring are compared with the convective indices for the observation period. To assess convective processes, we used physical and statistical parameters of instability calculated from ERA5 reanalysis: Upward Vertical Velocity, Vortex Generation Parameter, and WMAXSHEAR. Statistical characteristics of the zenith tropospheric delay’s horizontal gradient significantly change under conditions of deep convection. The results of the work can be used to develop a methodology for sub-satellite monitoring of convective processes in the tasks of operational forecasting of severe weather phenomena.

Possibilities of astronomical millimeter and submillimeter observations strongly depend on the precipitable water vapor (PWV), which determines the radiation absorption. The precise determination of PWV within large regions is one of key astroclimate problems. In this work, we refine estimates of PWV content for different sites based on processing ERA5 reanalysis and radiosounding data and test the previously proposed technique for correcting PWV values taking into account the characteristic water vapor vertical scale and relative altitude difference of grid nodes. In addition, the spatial distribution of the nighttime atmospheric optical thickness at a wavelength of 3 mm averaged over December - February 2013-2022 was derived for the first time for Russia and the adjacent territory. Our results can serve the basis for selecting an astronomic site for a new large millimeter telescope within the Eurasian Sub-Millimeter and Millimeter Telescope Project.

High-precision satellite laser ranging (SLR) is actively used all over the world to solve a variety of tasks, primarily in geodesy and navigation. However, the disadvantage of laser systems is the dependence of the effectiveness of their use on weather conditions, in particular, on the presence of clouds. However, in separate experiments conducted at the JSC “Precision Systems and Instruments" (JSC “PSI"), it was possible to receive laser pulses on board a spacecraft in cloudy conditions. The purpose of the work is to evaluate the possibility of functioning of the metrological laser system (MLS) developed at JSC “PSI" in the presence of certain types and forms of clouds that allow the reception and determination of the parameters of laser pulses. Mathematical models of the atmosphere for a laser radiation wavelength of 0.532 microns have been developed, including optical characteristics of the crystalline medium for aggregate structures of ice particles. Calculations of the transfer of optical radiation of subnanosecond laser pulses from ground stations to high-orbit and low-orbit spacecrafts in the presence of upper- and middle-level crystalline clouds have been performed. The amplitude-time characteristics of optical signals on board the spacecrafts are calculated. It is shown that the principles of one-sided SLR can be implemented in the presence of cirrus, cirrus-layered, and cirrus-cumulus clouds in the sky, as well as altostratus clouds with established limitations on the optical thickness. The results confirm the possibility of increasing the technological performance of high-precision SLR systems, in particular, MLS, since the repeatability of the cloud forms under study over the territory of the Russian Federation is about 20%.

In the proposed series of articles, based on the idea of the unity of scientism and worldview, we intend to identify and analyse the core functions of philosophy and their role in scientific knowledge. This article considers the genesis and foundations of the methodological function of philosophy in the course of its formation and development.

Since its beginning, the philosophy of science has appeared as a polemical space where, implicitly or explicitly, discussions take place concerning meaning-related questions of the subject and status of this field of philosophical knowledge and the relationship be-tween philosophy and science. Among the diverse answers to these questions, there are always those related to alternative approaches that turn out to be diametrically opposed. The article considers two alternatives. If the alternative “G. Hegel - O. Comte” reflects the final stage of the classical philosophy of science, then the alternative “logical positivists - theoretical physicists” is a vivid expression of non-classical philosophy of science.

The article formulates arguments for the independent significance of the problem of understanding in contemporary philosophy of science. Obviously, it is impossible to devel-op a serious concept of understanding without examining the indicators of understanding used by scientists. Having studied publications in the field of artificial intelligence, natural science and philosophy of science, the author describes the criteria of understanding used by researchers in these fields of knowledge. The main result is a preliminary classification of the criteria of understanding in view of their degrees of universality and the degrees of understanding of the problems being studied, which researchers get in the course of thinking about and solving these problems when using formal methods.

The paper aims to make a proper interpretation of the cases “Airport” by S. Cohen and “Bank” by K. DeRose as arguments for contextualism and against skepticism. At the time, D. Lewis set the main “paradigmatic” frame for modern contextualism: (a) fallibilism, (b) skepticism as a change of context, and (c) the emphasis on the need of pragmatic interpretation of the meaningfulness of statements, which is set by the “epistemic standard” that determines the strength of the “epistemic position” of the person attributing knowledge in a given context. Despite the fact that S. Cohen and K. DeRose describe different situations (in S. Cohen’s example we consider the situation of knowledge attribution not for a participant in the dialogue, but for a “third party”), for both examples we can offer a uniform interpretation, which, among other things, will explain why “epistemic standards” are different in different contexts. The basis for such an “interpretation” will be a specific psychological interpretation of condition (c) that describes the pragmatics of setting the meaningfulness of a statement in context. Forming his psychological “confidence” in P, the person will be guided by the limits after which “we are no longer forming belief, but already have a conviction” (J. Nagel) and “the degree of using the privileged information to predict a reaction of the other person” (E. Royzman et al.) that will operate differently from context to context. The essential point is that for such an approach to work, we should require that the causal structure of the subconscious processes that form a belief be isomorphic to the evidentialist structure of propositional justification. In our opinion, this is a much weaker assumption than the “we can know in everyday life” assumption that D. Lewis relied on in his own interpretation of contextualism.

The article criticizes the expanded interpretation of the concept of technoscience, namely the proclamation of the end of science as such and the arrival of a new era in the history of human knowledge. It is shown that the theoretical method as the basis of science has not undergone fundamental transformations since Plato’s age. The reason why classical logic and mathematics are effective in modelling reality is that the ontology of the world is isomorphic to logic and mathematics. It is the correspondence between logic and the world as such that makes science possible. If we can talk about methodological “techno-scientific” transformations, then this is nothing but a regression to the methodology of positivism.

The article deals with the analysis of the problem of identifying the structural unit of science and scientific knowledge. For a long time, discipline stood as such a unit, and the principle of disciplinarity acted as the dominant regulative principle. The article shows the mechanism of formation of disciplinary structures. It has been revealed that the phenomenon of disciplinarity occurs not in science itself, but at the interface of science and education, in the work of the institution of transmitting the scientific knowledge. The problem of searching for possible new structural units of scientific knowledge during the transition from science to technosciences is raised. It is shown that in the transition to interdisciplinary research, the discipline as a structural unit remains basic. The search for truly new structural units of scientific knowledge takes place in the transition from disciplinary structures to project formats, research programs, problem-solving and search activity engines, in implementing social activity engineering.

The article is aimed to examine the stages of development of mathematical proof as successive stages in the development of human thinking which progresses towards the increase of abstrаction. The point of view of I. Hacking is analyzed, who identifies different styles of mathematical proof - the approaches of Descartes and Leibniz. It is shown that these styles cannot be considered, following Hacking, as independent approaches to understanding proof. They represent the development of human consciousness, which advances from concrete concepts to abstrаct thinking, therefore the approaches of Descartes and Leibniz should be considered as historically developing approaches to under-standing evidence.